Implications

   Directly in the explosion on the fourth power is only one person was killed, another died on the morning of his injuries. Subsequently, the 134 staff members of the NPP and rescue teams were on station during the explosion, developed radiation sickness, 28 of them died within the next few months.

   At 1:24 at night, remote duty HRC-2 for the Protection of Chernobyl received a report about a fire. By the station went on duty guard the fire station, headed by Lieutenant internal service Pravik (14 people per Zil-131). Taking leadership in extinguishing the fire itself, it is conveyed by radio message to the remote duty of the Fire Protection Pripyat (SVPCH-6) for assistance. Of the fire department arrived, Lieutenant Kibenok, as with the guard on duty from 10 people. As the chain was transferred to the message of fire High rates of complexity, which should arrive to the station fire departments Kiev and the surrounding areas. Manual fire extinguishing assumed arrived at the station, Major Telyatnikov. After the arrival of the first guard started extinguishing the fire on the roof of the machine room and in the reactor hall. Most seriously injured firefighters, tushivshie reactor hall. By 4 am the fire was localized on the roof of the machine room, and by 6 o'clock in the morning was extinguished. All took part in extinguishing the fire 69 personnel and 14 vehicles. The presence of high levels of radiation have been reliably established only 3:30, as the two devices available for 1000 roentgens per hour and one out of order, and another was unavailable due to obstructions encountered. Therefore, in the early hours of the accident were unknown actual levels of radiation in space and around the block. It was not clear and the state reactor.

   Firefighters prevented the fire spread to the third block (in the third and 4 th power common transitions). Of the remedies from the fire was only boevka (tarp robe), helmet and gloves. In masks TRC-5 work was impossible because of the high temperature combustion [source not specified 186 days], they fire took off in the first 10 minutes. Instead of fire-resistant coatings, as has been put on the instructions, the roof of the machine room was flooded with the usual flammable bitumen. At about 2 o'clock in the morning there were first affected by a number of firefighters. They began to show weakness, vomiting, "nuclear tan", and after removing gloves and the skin was removed from the hands. Help them to the field, in the infirmary station, then transported to the city hospital Pripyat. April 27 the first group of victims of the 28 people flown to Moscow, in the 6 th radiological hospital. Virtually no drivers suffered engine vehicles.

   Lt. VN Kibenko and VP Pravik was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Fire Titenok, Tischura, Ignatenko, and others who fought the fire in the reactor hall was posthumously were awarded orders and medals.

   In the first hours after the accident, many people apparently did not realize how badly damaged the reactor, so it was taken wrong decision to ensure the flow of water into the reactor core for its cooling. These efforts proved futile, as both the pipelines, and the very active area were destroyed, because of what was required to work in areas with high radiation. Other actions of the staff station, such as quenching of local seats of fire in the premises of the station, measures aimed at preventing a possible explosion of hydrogen, in contrast, were necessary. They probably prevented more serious consequences. For this work, many employees of the station received a large dose of radiation, and some even fatal. Among them were the head shift of A. Akimov and operator L. Toptunov, controlled reactor during the accident.

   Releases resulted in the death of trees next to the plant on an area about 10 km ².

 
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